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Abstract 
 
Using ten waves (1998-2007) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), this paper investigates the 
ceteris paribus association between the intensity of incentive pay, the dynamic change in bonus status and 
the utility derived from work.  After controlling for individual heterogeneity biases, it is shown that job 
utility rises only in response to „generous‟ bonus payments, primarily in skilled, non-unionized, private 
sector jobs.  Revoking a bonus from one year to the next is found to have a detrimental impact on 
employee utility, while job satisfaction tends to diminish over time as employees potentially adapt to 
bonuses.  The findings are therefore consistent with previous experimental evidence, suggesting that 
employers wishing to motivate their staff should indeed “pay enough or don’t pay at all”. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The principal-agent model, with its convincing illustration of the trade-off that arises between risk and 
incentive provision when attempting to align the conflicting interests of two contracting parties, remains 
central for our understanding of the compensation strategies employed by firms (Mirlees, 1976; 
Holmstrom, 1979).  According to the standard model of agency theory, the introduction of financial 
incentives as part of an agent‟s remuneration package will increase his/her productivity, as it is assumed 
that individuals derive utility from income whilst the exertion of effort entails a utility cost.  Importantly, 
if the additional disutility of higher effort is compensated by an adequate wage premium, an implication 
of the theory is that the marginal utilities of workers under fixed and variable compensation schemes 
should be equalized in the long-run.  What this implies is that there should be no difference between the 
job satisfaction of employees receiving monetary incentives and those on non-contingent payment 
arrangements.  
The above conclusion has been disputed by a psychological (and, increasingly, economics) literature, 
which has stressed that the incorporation of non-pecuniary motives into the economic paradigm, such as 
the desire for reciprocation or for engaging in interesting tasks, has important implications for an 
individual‟s motivation and job satisfaction (Deci, 1971; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Kreps, 1997; Frey, 1997; 
Frey and Jegen, 2001).  In addition, it has been argued that „wrong‟ monetary incentives may incite 
dysfunctional behavioural responses by employees (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992; 
Prendergast, 1999), or have a detrimental effect on employee morale and job security via the inequitable 
and risky pay distributions that arise as a consequence (Baker et al., 1988).   
Once these mechanisms are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that the theoretical impact of 
monetary incentives on worker effort and job satisfaction can be ambiguous.  As corroborated in a 
number of economic experiments (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Eriksson and Villeval, 2008), the incentive 
effects of monetary rewards are likely to be compromised in a world of imperfect labour mobility 
populated by heterogeneous agents with varying psychological dispositions.  To the extent that incentive 
schemes allow for optimization of effort, facilitate worker autonomy and enhance self-determination they 
should increase job satisfaction, other things equal.  Yet increasing earnings risk, crowding out of the 
inherent pleasantness in performing one‟s job and lower morale can lead to disgruntled employees.   
The study of the effect of monetary rewards on job satisfaction is therefore an empirical issue, which 
has only until recently received any attention.  In particular, a number of studies have shown that in 
Britain bonuses result in higher job satisfaction, although the effect of individual-based performance-
related pay (PRP) systems is not as clear-cut once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account (Drago 
et al., 1992; McCausland et al., 2005, Artz, 2008, Green and Heywood, 2008; Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 
2009).  Using US data, Heywood and Wei (2006) have also confirmed that all types of PRP (bar piece-
rates) yield greater job satisfaction relative to time rates.   
 3 
A potential deficiency of the above-mentioned studies is that they only focus on the discrete 
difference in job satisfaction between workers receiving PRP and those on alternative schemes.  Thus, 
they ignore the fact that worker performance and satisfaction may vary according to the magnitude of  
incentives.  As suggested by a series of field experiments performed by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000[a], 
p. 802), “for all positive but small enough compensations, there is a reduction in performance as 
compared with the zero compensation, or, better, with the lack of any mention of compensation”.  
Nevertheless, once the extrinsic motivation is large enough, it results in better performance than in the no-
incentive case.  This non-monotonicity in the reaction of worker effort to both positive and negative 
incentives (e.g. bonuses or fines, respectively) has consequently been termed the “W effect” of incentives 
(Gneezy, 2004).
1
  By contrast, the recent experimental study of Pokorny (2008) finds an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between effort levels and incentive intensity.  
This paper attempts to test the above contrasting hypotheses by looking beyond the mere incidence of 
incentive pay and examining the impact of the intensity of incentives (i.e. the proportion of workers‟ 
salary that is tied to bonuses) on job satisfaction instead.  Specifically, 10 waves (1998-2007) of the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) are used to investigate the association between the power of 
bonus payments and the utility derived from work, holding the incidence of individual-based PRP and 
other important determinants constant.  After controlling for individual fixed effects (such as ability or 
motivation) that may bias the influence of payment schemes on job satisfaction, job utility is found to rise 
only in response to „large‟ bonus payments.  Evidence is also presented that revoking a bonus from one 
year to the next is likely to have a detrimental effect on employee utility, and that over time job 
satisfaction tends to diminish as employees potentially adapt to the payment of bonuses.  The empirical 
evidence of the paper is therefore consistent with Gneezy and Rustichini‟s (2000[a]) assertion that 
employers wishing to motivate their staff should indeed “pay enough or don’t pay at all”. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 engages in a review of the available literature on 
the effect of financial incentives on job satisfaction.  In Section 3 the data used in the study are described 
and preliminary statistical correlations are outlined.  Section 4 describes the basic econometric 
methodology used in the paper.  Section 5 outlines the main empirical results of the relationship between 
incentive intensity and the utility derived from employment.  Section 6 examines the heterogeneity in the 
sample further.  Finally, Section 7 concludes.       
                                                                                     
II. LITERATURE REVIEW: THE IMPACT OF INCENTIVE PAY ON JOB SATISFACTION 
 
The growing economics literature on subjective well-being (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Clark, 1999; 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004; EPICURUS, 2007) has 
emphasized that measures of job satisfaction are significant predictors of employee behaviour (e.g. quits 
(Freeman, 1978), absenteeism (Clegg, 1983) or worker productivity (Judge et al., 2001)).  It follows that 
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understanding the influence of monetary incentives on job satisfaction is important given that the 
composition of an employee‟s remuneration package is an integral element of his/her overall working 
conditions.   
The fact that firms typically employ a wide array of incentive instruments has been attributed to the 
fundamental agency problem that plagues the employment relationship (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999).  
In order to combat the problem of moral hazard, firms design incentive contracts that seek to achieve goal 
congruence with their employees (Mirlees, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979).
2
  Furthermore, as shown by Lazear 
(1986, 2000), the introduction of financial rewards should induce more highly geared workers to put forth 
extra effort to the point where the marginal value added equates the marginal cost of the additional 
labour.
3
  In long-run equilibrium, however, one would not expect to observe any differences in the 
marginal utilities of comparable workers under fixed or variable payment schemes, as the expected value 
of the higher wages paid under PRP should be just sufficient to compensate for the additional earnings 
risk and the disutility of extra effort (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). 
Once the standard assumptions of the agency model are relaxed, though, there are many reasons to 
expect that PRP is likely to have a non-negligible impact on job satisfaction.  Expectancy-based theories 
of organizational psychology have asserted that attitudes about work are shaped from the rewards 
produced by performance (Lawler and Porter, 1967), which are valued outcomes in themselves (Judge et 
al., 2001, p. 378; Brown and Sessions, 2003).
4
  Furthermore, it has been argued that PRP is an integral 
element of so-called „high performance workplace practices‟, which have been found to be positively 
related to job satisfaction (Bauer, 2004).   
Other aspects of PRP may, nonetheless, diminish productivity and worker satisfaction.  It has been 
illustrated that wrongly devised compensation schemes can have counterproductive consequences, as they 
may encourage workers to „game‟ the compensation system to their advantage by multitasking (Baker, 
1992) or by engaging in rent-seeking behaviour aimed at influencing the subjective evaluations of line 
managers (Prendergast, 1999).  Holmstrom‟s (1982) seminal paper has also showed that utilizing team 
production incentive schemes (such as profit-sharing) may dilute individual performance as a result of 
free-riding.  In the face of evidence suggesting that the job satisfaction of employees is intrinsically linked 
to their relative pay status (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Clark, 1999; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Clark et al., 
2008[a]), the demoralising dispersion and variability in wages that ensues from PRP schemes is also 
likely to affect attitudes to work in a negative fashion.  Furthermore, it has often been claimed that 
financial incentives undermine collaboration and team work, emphasize the power asymmetry between 
management and the workforce, and reduce employee risk-taking and innovation (Kohn, 1993).   
Added to the above is a prominent non-economic criticism of PRP which is based on the so-called 
cognitive evaluation or motivation crowding-out hypothesis (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey and Jegen, 
2001).  According to this theory of social psychology, once it is acknowledged that individuals may 
derive intrinsic satisfaction from their jobs, explicit rewards that are perceived as controlling devices or 
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as indicators that the employment relationship is a pure market exchange (Kreps, 1997, p. 363), are likely 
to compromise job satisfaction and performance.  In fact, there are now a number of experimental studies 
indicating that financial incentives may backfire by acting as a signal of employer distrust (Falk and 
Kosfeld, 2006) or by undermining reciprocity-based voluntary cooperation (Fehr and Gachter, 1998).      
Only until recently did the economic literature pay any attention to the study of which of the 
aforementioned effects of PRP on job utility predominates.  Drago et al. (1992) and McCausland et al. 
(2005) were among the first to contrast the satisfaction of employees receiving PRP with those on 
alternative arrangements.  The latter find that PRP may have demotivating consequences for the lower-
paid segment of the population (after correcting for potential selectivity bias).  Heywood and Wei‟s 
(2006) analysis shows that profit sharing and PRP are associated with higher overall job satisfaction in 
the US, though they find evidence that piece rates in particular may have a negative effect.  More 
recently, Green and Heywood (2008) and Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2009) use the BHPS to investigate 
the impact of PRP on a fuller set of facets of job satisfaction.  They show that although bonuses and 
profit-sharing schemes result in higher mean job satisfaction, the effect of individual-specific PRP 
diminishes once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account.  They also fail to find any supporting 
evidence in favour of arguments that PRP crowds-out the intrinsic satisfaction of jobs or has an adverse 
impact on job security.  Artz (2008), on the other hand, argues that, on the net, PRP increases job 
satisfaction but does so largely among union workers and males in larger firms. 
The above studies focus merely on the impact of the incidence of PRP on job satisfaction.  This 
masks the possibility that the utility of workers may vary according to the magnitude and intensity of 
incentives, as suggested by the experiments of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000[a][b]).  In these experiments, 
the effect of the introduction of a monetary reward and the differential impact of small and large payoffs 
is tested on the performance of students from Israel.  The evidence indicates that “the effect of monetary 
incentives can be, in small amounts, detrimental to performance” and that there is “a discontinuity at the 
zero payment of the effect of monetary incentives” (ibid., p. 801-802).5             
An important common element of the above experiments is that “small” incentives are likely to exert 
a negative effect on behaviour (with discontinuity close to zero), while for high powered rewards (or 
punishments) the standard price effect is expected to prevail.
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  This prediction has been corroborated in 
the proposer-respondent game experiment of Gneezy (2004), which ultimately gives rise to a (V)W-
shaped relationship between effort and the intensity of (positive) incentives.  In contrast, the IQ and 
counting tasks experiments performed by Pokorny (2008) on undergraduate German students indicate an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between effort levels and the strength of monetary payoffs.  The author 
attributes her contradicting findings to the existence of reference dependent preferences among subjects, 
which imply decreasing effort choices with stronger incentives once a reference income level is exceeded. 
Another example of the non-monotonic motivation effect of incentives can be found in the field study of 
Marsden et al. (2001), who highlight that although a large number of workers in their sample experienced 
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a deterioration of workplace relations and cooperation following the introduction of incentive pay, PRP 
motivated those who received above average payments.     
The remainder of the paper now turns to an investigation of which of the aforementioned contrasting 
patterns, as depicted in Figure 1, are likely to describe the association between job satisfaction and the 
intensity of monetary rewards received by British employees.   
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The study uses data from waves 8 to 17 (1998-2007) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), as 
readily available information on individual-based PRP is only available for those years, while the survey 
question clarifying the amount of bonus pay was asked from 1997 onwards.  The BHPS is a nationally 
representative survey that each year interviews a random sample of nearly 10,000 individuals in 
approximately 5,500 British households.  It has been conducted annually since late 1991 and contains a 
wealth of information on employees‟ personal and employment characteristics.  The sample used in the 
paper is restricted to individuals between 18 and 65 years of age who are paid employees at the survey 
date.  For 10 waves of the BHPS this yields an unbalanced panel of 67,535 observations on 14,479 unique 
individuals. 
A sizeable portion of this sample (25.77% corresponding to 17,372 observations) has replied 
affirmatively to the question: “In the last 12 months have you received any bonuses such as a Christmas 
or quarterly bonus, profit-related pay or profit sharing bonus, or an occasional commission?  This 
excludes overtime payments”. 7  Beginning from wave 7, the above subset of individuals are also asked to 
state in a follow-up question the exact amount of bonus/profit-sharing they received in the previous year, 
and whether this amount is gross or net of taxes.  Finally, in order to capture the presence of pay 
incentives that are based on individual employee performance only, the BHPS has asked since 1998 the 
question “Does your pay include performance related pay”?.  Approximately 14% of the sample 
responded that they are indeed recipients of such a form of compensation.
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Focussing on the non-missing responses regarding the amount of bonus/profit-sharing received, the 
answers of 7% of the sample (4,849 out of a total of 17,372 observations) who provided a post-tax figure 
were initially converted into a gross amount.  This was done by utilizing the available information on the 
gross and take-home pay (at the last payment) of the respondents, subsequently calculating the rate with 
which the net bonus figures should be multiplied in order to be converted into a gross amount.  In 
addition, in order to neutralize the effect of outliers, the bonus variable was top-coded at the 99
th
 
percentile of its distribution (corresponding to an annual bonus payment of £31k).  After engaging in the 
above manipulations, the individuals in the sample are found to receive average bonus/profit-sharing 
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payments of £1684 per annum.  This corresponds to approximately 6.7% of their average yearly gross 
usual earnings.           
Table 1 provides a break-down of the mean amount of bonus received by various demographic and 
socio-economic groups of the sample, along with the respective incentive intensity.  The latter is defined 
as the proportion of the respondents‟ usual gross yearly earnings that is tied to the payment of bonuses.  It 
is evident that men receive higher bonus/profit-sharing payments on average relative to women, while an 
inverse U-shaped age effect is apparent.  Individuals who are married and more educated are also 
recipients of higher incentive rewards.  With respect to working conditions, full-time employees who 
work in the private sector, on permanent contracts and in non-union jobs are found to enjoy greater 
bonuses.  Finally, the receipt of individual-based PRP, firm size and the type of occupation also play an 
important role in determining the amount of reward, with managers and professionals benefiting the most.         
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Following the rating of various partial job satisfactions (e.g. promotion prospects, total pay, relations 
with supervisors, job security, ability to work on own initiative, the actual work itself and hours of work), 
individuals in the BHPS are asked a question regarding their overall job satisfaction, worded as follows: 
“All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present job overall using the same 
1-7 scale?”.9  Answers are evaluated on a seven point scale, where a value of one corresponds to „not 
satisfied at all‟ and seven reflects „complete satisfaction‟.  These job satisfaction responses are employed 
in this study to identify the determinants of the utility of employment as perceived by the individual 
workers themselves.   
Table 2 shows how the mean values of job satisfaction vary depending on the type of incentive pay 
provided and the incentive intensity.  It is interesting that average job satisfaction varies in a V-type 
fashion with the intensity of bonus/profit-sharing pay received by employees.   It initially falls from a 
value of 5.37, when no bonus rewards are present, to 5.32 for those who receive bonuses equivalent to 1-
3% of their total remuneration.  Job satisfaction subsequently rises at above average rewards, exhibiting a 
marked increase for workers at the top 5% of the bonus ladder (5.47).   
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table A1 in the Appendix also  presents some descriptive statistics on a number of other important 
explanatory variables, which are expected to influence job satisfaction.  These factors constitute a 
standard control set in the job satisfaction literature, and have been specifically chosen to be consistent 
with those used in Green and Heywood (2008) and Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2009). 
 
IV. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY   
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In the remaining part of the paper a multivariate regression methodology is employed in order to uncover 
the true ceteris paribus influence of the explanatory variables on job satisfaction.  The empirical 
framework that is employed assumes that (either partial or overall) job satisfaction (JS) of individual i (i = 
1,…, N) in time period t (t = 1,…, 10) is a function of a variety of individual and job characteristics:  
ittititit uJS  TXI 4321   (1) 
where X is a vector of individual and employment variables assumed to influence JS (inclusive of the 
incidence of individual-based PRP), T is a vector of yearly dummy variables capturing the presence of 
fixed time effects (such as changing technologies or shifting managerial styles, both of which could 
potentially affect the relationship between bonuses and JS), the ‟s are associated coefficients, and uit is a 
randomly distributed error term with E(u) = 0 and 2)( uE uu .  The main independent regressor I is a 
variable denoting the incentive intensity of employees‟ annual remuneration, I*, as follows: 






00
1*
s
s
Bif
BifI
I     (2) 
where Bs is the endogenously determined selection variable that denotes whether individual workers have 
received a bonus or not: 

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s
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Bif
Bif
B    (3) 
Using I as the main explanatory variable in the specification, as opposed to including the amount of 
bonus, B, or the absolute level of pay, W, as separate variables, takes into account the fact that agency 
theory is primarily concerned with the optimal determination of I.  It also reflects the fact that W and B 
are likely to be simultaneously set by employers.  Estimation of their separate influence on job 
satisfaction is therefore likely to be fraught by endogeneity bias.  Of course, (1) neglects the fact that the 
inherent level of risk to which employees of a similar level of I are exposed to may differ according to 
their underlying level of wealth.  For this reason, particular attention has been paid so that the control set 
includes both objective and subjective variables which accurately describe the financial situation of the 
respondents, such as their household income.  
One way of estimating the above system is by regressing the dependent JS variable against I, using 
only the sample of individuals that are recipients of positive monetary incentives (Bs = 1).  Such a course 
of action gives rise to the potential of selectivity bias, and hence requires a Heckman-type estimator 
(Heckman, 1979; McCausland et al., 2005).  The latter procedure is reliant on the presence of appropriate 
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identifying variables, Z, in the selection equation, which describes the likelihood of individuals being 
recipients of incentive pay: 
ittitsitB   TZ 321   (4) 
where φ is the error term and γ are associated regression coefficients. 
Nevertheless, in order to test Gneezy‟s (2004) suggestion that there is discontinuity close to the zero 
payoff in the effect of monetary rewards on job performance, as well as the evidence of Marsden et al. 
(2001) that only above average incentives are beneficial, the preferred specification in this paper involves 
the estimation of equation (1) on the full sample of workers, using a series of indicator variables Id, as 
regressors: 
ittitditit uJS  TXI 4321   (5) 
where d refers to the 0, 5
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles of the frequency distribution of the variable 
I.  The main regressors of interest are therefore a series of dummy variables that distinguish individuals 
according to whether the proportion of their annual earnings that is linked to bonus pay is 0% (reference 
category), less than 1%, between 1-3%, 3-8%, 8-25% and above 25%, respectively.   
Given the ordered categorical nature of the dependent variable, JS, estimation of equation (5) is 
conventionally implemented using an ordered probit (OP) estimator (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975).  
However, the empirical strategy also takes into account the fact that an OP procedure is likely to reveal a 
distorted effect of Id on JS, given the presence of unobserved heterogeneity among the employees of the 
sample.  Specifically, it is reasonable to believe on the grounds of agency theory that bonus payments are 
likely to be higher for those individuals who are less risk-averse, more extrinsically motivated and for 
whom the cost of effort is less dear (Lazear, 1986).  Given that these individual attributes, which are 
likely to be correlated with both Id and JS, are unobserved to the survey statistician, it follows that a 
simple OP regression of (5) might lead to inconsistent estimates.  This is also likely to be true given that 
the analysis can only control for a limited set of firm characteristics, which is a notable deficiency given 
that the latter are likely to be endogenously related to wage schemes.  It is therefore necessary to estimate 
(5) using a fixed effects model of panel analysis (Wooldridge, 2002).  As is standard, the idiosyncratic 
disturbance term uit is split into the time-invariant fixed individual effect, εi, and a pure random error 
term, ηit, with E(ηit) = 0 and E(εi, ηit) = 0, as follows:   
itititditit IJS   TX 4321  (6) 
Given that with the estimation of equation (6) the influence of any fixed individual effects is controlled 
for, it is hence expected that the „true‟ influence of Id on job satisfaction will be uncovered.      
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Ordered probit estimates of the effect of bonus intensity on job satisfaction 
From the regression output in Table 3 interesting insights regarding the impact of incentive pay on job 
utility are drawn.
10
  According to the predictions of previous studies, the incidence of bonus pay is 
associated with a significantly higher level of overall job satisfaction.  The OP estimates of Column (1) in 
Table 3 illustrate further that this effect is magnified as the intensity of rewards increase, though no 
significant effect is found for small bonuses that account for less than 1% of employees‟ salary.  Indeed, 
in terms of the economic significance of the estimates it is calculated that as the intensity of incentives 
increases, the probability of reporting the highest possible score on the satisfaction scale (i.e. 7) rises by 
approximately 1% at the mean (relative to those who do not receive incentive wages).  This likelihood 
rises to as much as 4% for those at the top 5% of the ladder of rewards, which is one of the most 
pronounced impacts that any of the explanatory variables in the model have on job satisfaction.    
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In order to scrutinize the effect of the bonus intensity variable further, the analysis is replicated by 
omitting from the sample employees who receive individual PRP.  This is done since the BHPS does not 
contain information on the proportion of workers‟ salary that is exposed to PRP.  Such a deficiency may 
confound the main estimates, given that it is likely that the respondents who were in simultaneous receipt 
of bonuses and PRP may have not separated the two when answering the amount of bonus question in the 
questionnaire.  Indeed, it is clear from the data that the incentive intensity of those workers who received 
both types of reward is higher compared to those who declared that they were in receipt of bonuses only 
(9% vs. 5.7%, respectively).  Reassuringly, once the individuals receiving PRP are ignored, a slightly 
stronger significant effect of bonus intensity on job satisfaction is found, as can be seen in Table A2 
(Column 1) in the Appendix.      
To test the robustness of the bonus coefficient further, the regression of equation (5) is performed 
using a more detailed occupational classification than before.  Since the offer of bonus pay occurs more 
frequently in certain occupations (for example, larger bonuses are more common in the financial sector), 
the use of detailed occupational controls may capture the variation in incentive pay across workers in a 
more accurate fashion.  As is confirmed in Table A2 (Column 2), the effect of the bonus intensity 
variables remains robust to the inclusion of two-digit occupational dummy variables in the specification, 
with even the lowest intensity category now having a significant effect. 
The main regression has also been repeated after retaining only the sample of respondents who 
provided a before-tax figure of the amount of bonus awarded.  This is done in order to examine the 
sensitivity of the results to the conversion of the after-tax bonus data to gross amounts, as discussed in 
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section 3.  Reassuringly, the robustness of the positive effect of higher bonus intensity on job satisfaction 
is confirmed (Column 3 Table A2).      
It is important to notice that the positive relationship between job satisfaction and incentive intensity 
is found even after including various measures of reference dependent earnings within the control set (see 
Column 4 of Table A2), such as the comparison level of bonuses received by „comparable‟ workers each 
year (Clark and Oswald, 1996), or the prior (Clark, 1999) and posterior (Chevalier and Lydon, 2002) 
financial comparisons of an individual with his/her past and future financial situation, respectively.  This 
casts doubt on the assertion that job utility increases with incentives only when individual wages have not 
surpassed a given reference point, as would be the suggestion of the Pokorny (2008) model.             
    Finally, it may be argued that the magnitude of the bonus payments to workers, and hence their 
degree of job satisfaction, may be directly dependent on the economic conditions faced by firms, which 
will determine whether they have a good or a bad fiscal year.  Given that information on the financial 
situation of the individual firms offering incentive pay is not available, the main regression has been 
executed by including the regional unemployment rate as a proxy for the demand conditions prevailing in 
the economy in a particular year.  The addition of this variable in the specification, along with the time 
fixed effects, is believed to capture some of the variability in job satisfaction scores that is related to 
shifting economic conditions over time.  As shown in Column (5) of Table A2, the effect of the bonus 
dummies remains unaffected.           
 
5.2 Correcting for unobserved heterogeneity bias 
As discussed in section 3, the omission of important variables from the specification is likely to bias the 
coefficients of the incentive variables.  In general, the magnitude of bonus wages is not only a function of 
employee characteristics, but also depends on whether firms place a high or a low „gearing‟ on 
performance.  To the extent that some of these unobserved factors are time-invariant, a fixed-effects 
estimation of equation (6) is therefore likely to provide a more consistent estimate of the influence of 
varying bonus intensity on job satisfaction.
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Following the removal of unmeasured effects, the positive effect of bonuses on job satisfaction is 
found to be pronounced (and statistically significant) only for individuals at the top 25% of the ladder of 
rewards (see Column 3 of Table 3).  These results are hence indicative of the presence of unobserved 
person- or job-specific characteristics, which are correlated with both performance-contingent modes of 
pay and the job satisfaction scores.   
      
5.3  Correcting for selectivity bias of incentive pay 
In order to detect the marginal effect of an increase in bonus intensity on job satisfaction, Heckman‟s 
consistent two-step estimator is also employed after restricting the sample to include only those workers 
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who are in receipt of bonuses (excluding PRP as described above).  This entails the estimation of the 
selection equation (4) as a first stage, which identifies the probability of individuals being offered a bonus 
(see Column 4 of Table A3 in the Appendix).  Identification is achieved via the inclusion of an additional 
variable, namely whether the pay slip of individuals was seen by the interviewer at the time of the survey.  
This is confirmed to be exogenous to the job satisfaction process, yet significantly related to the incidence 
of bonus pay as stated by the respondents.  It is believed that this variable is found to be statistically 
related to the incidence of bonus pay (at the 1% level of significance) given that the exhibition of the pay 
slip is likely to have minimized the potential for recall bias on behalf of the interviewees.   
Following the above procedure, job satisfaction is regressed on a continuous measure of bonus 
intensity (Proportion).
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  No evidence of selectivity bias is detected, as evidenced by the insignificant 
mills ratio term in Column (4) of Table 3.  Furthermore, it is found that a 1% increase in the proportion of 
workers‟ compensation that is tied to bonuses is found to increase their job satisfaction rating by 0.004 
points, which is equivalent to an marginal increase of 5% (0.004/7*100) in utility.   
 
5.4  Comparing like with like: examining an alternative counterfactual 
As opposed to comparing the utility of workers who are paid a non-variable wage with those receiving 
bonuses, one can examine an alternative counterfactual which allows for a more accurate evaluation of 
the impact of varying amounts of bonuses across individuals who are more „alike‟.  This involves the 
ceteris paribus contrast of job satisfaction between employees who are paid by PRP but not bonuses (the 
reference category), with those who are recipients only of bonuses (but not PRP).  Given that in this case 
the focus is exclusively on those in receipt of incentive pay, it is expected that the aforementioned 
comparison is between workers who possess more „similar‟ characteristics.  Of course, in order 
implement such an exercise a Heckman-type strategy is required, as in section 5.3 above, that takes into 
account the selectivity bias of focusing on individuals who are given incentive rewards.  The results of 
this estimation are presented in Table 3 (Column 5), where it is evident that a significant positive impact 
is found only for those individuals receiving more than 25% of their pay in bonuses.      
 
VI. FURTHER ANALYSIS  
 
6.1  Effect of bonus intensity on satisfaction with facets of jobs 
In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the effect of bonus intensity on job satisfaction, equation (6) 
has been regressed using the facets of job satisfaction that are available in the BHPS as dependent 
variables.  The estimated coefficients are depicted in Table 4, whereby it is evident that higher financial 
incentives increase workers‟ satisfaction with their total pay and job security, without having any 
significant adverse impact on satisfaction with their hours of work.  An interesting result, however, is that 
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smaller bonus rewards are found to exert a significant negative effect on the satisfaction that employees 
derive from the actual work itself.  To the extent that the latter constitutes a proxy for the intrinsic 
motivation of individuals, this significant negative association provides some evidence that the so-called 
crowding-out hypothesis may be related to the magnitude of the financial reward, as suggested by Gneezy 
and Rustichini (2000[a]).          
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
6.2  Effect of bonus intensity by key characteristics 
Significant heterogeneity in the effect of bonus intensity on job satisfaction is found for various sub-
groups of the population.  While Heywood and Green (2008) and Artz (2008) argue that bonuses and 
profit-sharing schemes seem to be more beneficial for men rather than women on average, Table 5 
illustrates that this finding is driven by the greater job satisfaction of male employees at the highest 
segment of the bonus distribution only.     
The former authors also present evidence that the offer of bonuses is likely to have a differential 
impact on the job satisfaction of union and non-union employees.  Nevertheless, it is revealed in Table 5 
that only the satisfaction of non-union workers whose compensation is at the upper tails of the bonus 
distribution is likely to be affected.  No effect, in contrast, is found in the satisfaction of unionized 
employees.     
It has often been argued that in certain organisational environments where intrinsic work motivation 
is high (e.g. public sector jobs), the need for incentive pay is reduced and different pay arrangements need 
to be designed instead (Burgess and Rato, 2003).  Furthermore, it has been asserted that individuals who 
are employed in unskilled manual occupations might suffer from a greater inability to diversify the 
additional risk that is inherent in the variability of incentive schemes, relative to those who are at the top 
of the income distribution (McCausland et al., 2005).  The coefficients in Table 5 provide some support 
to these hypotheses, as they indicate that „large‟ bonus outlays are only likely to enhance the job 
satisfaction of private sector employees who are employed in skilled occupations.  
The above analysis therefore suggests that relatively generous bonuses are likely to have a prominent 
impact on the job satisfaction of male, skilled employees who are employed in private sector jobs and 
whose workplace is not covered by a trade union arrangement.     
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
6.3  Effect of dynamic changes in bonus status on job satisfaction  
Apart from emphasizing that employers must pay considerably large bonuses in order to motivate 
workers, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000[a]) also assert that the introduction of a monetary incentive is 
likely to alter the nature of an incomplete contract.  For instance, if workers had previously engaged in 
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certain job tasks without compensation, once the employer associates those activities with the payment of 
bonuses the perception of the contract now changes, with the employee “expecting” to be paid for the 
execution of those tasks in the future.  Crucially, what this implies is that “the change in perception, once 
realized, is hard to reverse” (ibid, 2000, p. 804), so that one would expect that the fall in motivation once 
a reward is revoked will be larger than the original gain in satisfaction following the introduction of an 
incentive bonus.   
Evidence in favour of this assertion is provided by the raw statistics in the dataset, as it is found that 
the average job satisfaction of workers switching from no bonus payments to positive ones is greater than 
of those moving in the reverse direction (5.33 versus 5.24, respectively).  Examining this issue further 
using a multivariate fixed effects regression approach, interesting findings arise when looking at the job 
satisfaction of workers who have experienced a change in the incidence of bonus pay.  Specifically, as 
can be seen from Table 6, Gneezy and Rustichini‟s (2000[a]) claim is confirmed, as there is a 
significantly lower level of job satisfaction experienced by individuals who move from having a bonus in 
one year to not receiving it in the following year (relative to those who are not paid a bonus continuously 
throughout time).  In contrast, the utility from work rises for employees who receive a bonus even though 
they did not do so in the previous year, though the increase in satisfaction is not significant relative to the 
reference group. 
Another interesting implication of the analysis is that employees who receive bonuses for a number 
of consecutive years experience a lower mean level of job satisfaction, relative to those who do not 
receive such contingent pay over time.  This can potentially be explained on the basis of adaptation of 
workers to their compensation, given that, as most managers would attest to, individuals tend to get 
accustomed to a given level of pay (Lawler, 1971; Georgellis et al., 2008; Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 
2010).  To further understand the dynamics of the adaptation process, the “leads and lags” methodology 
of Clark et al. (2008[b]) and Georgellis and Tabvuma (2010) has thus been adopted, whereby workers are 
identified according to the number of years that they consecutively receive a bonus since their initial 
change in payment status.  The following regression equation has therefore been estimated: 
itititititititititit BBBBBBBJS   665544332211001 X  (7) 
where B0it=1, captures individuals currently in receipt of a bonus even though they were not paid as such 
in the previous year (i.e. Bt = 1 but  Bt-11).  Similarly, being offered a bonus for one to two years, B1it=1, 
is identified as Bt=1, Bt-1=1 and Bt-21, and so on for longer lags.  The last category, B6it, is a catch all 
dummy for those individuals that have received a bonus for more than 5 years continuously.   
A fixed effects estimator is employed in order to account for the fact that unobserved characteristics 
may be associated with the propensity of individuals to move across different states.  Based on the 
estimation of equation (7), negative coefficients are found for those individuals who continue to get paid 
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by bonuses after the initial switch in status.  However, the fall in job satisfaction is significant only for 
those who have received incentive pay for four consecutive years.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The findings of this paper provide support to experimental evidence that monetary incentives may have a 
positive effect on workers‟ utility and performance as long as they are large enough.  All other things 
equal, a higher intensity of rewards is observed to enhance the utility that workers derive from their jobs.  
These conclusions hold even after controlling for the effect of unobserved heterogeneous biases that 
confound the incentives-job satisfaction relationship.   
Nevertheless, the significant negative association between „small‟ bonus payments and the 
satisfaction of workers with the actual job itself, along with evidence that the retrieval of a bonus may 
have a deleterious effect on job satisfaction after this has been already paid, draws attention to the fact 
that caution should be exercised by employers in their decision whether to introduce a „small‟ monetary 
incentive in the first place.  In addition, firms should be wary of the potentially weakening or insignificant 
influence that the payment of bonuses may have on job satisfaction over time.  Once introduced, though, 
the findings of this paper suggest that “generous” rewards are more likely to foster positive attitudes 
towards work among male employees who work in skilled occupations within the non-unionized private 
sector of the economy.   
Future research should attempt to augment the empirical specification of this study with the inclusion 
of an enlarged set of firm characteristics, so that more precise estimates are obtained.  In particular, a 
matched employer-employee dataset would allow for a more accurate evaluation of the effect of incentive 
intensity on employee satisfaction, since this would permit observation of the type of workers that are 
recipients of bonus pay, along with identification of the provision of PRP systems within their specific 
firms.  One can envisage, for example, that the negative effect of no incentive payments on job 
satisfaction will be more pronounced for employees who work in organizations that offer bonuses to their 
co-workers but not to themselves.  Unfortunately, although matched employer-employee datasets exist in 
the UK context, to the author‟s knowledge none of them contain at present information about the amount 
of incentive pay received by workers.      
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Table 1  Mean amount and intensity of annual gross bonus/profit-sharing by 
groups, BHPS, Employees, 1998-2007 
 N  
(All) 
Mean  
(Bonus > 0) 
Intensity 
(Bonus > 0) 
Gender    
Male 32189 2089.0 0.072 
Female 35346 1126.5 0.059 
Age    
18-25 10202 902.6 0.055 
26-35 17702 1827.5 0.073 
36/45 18768 2037.5 0.072 
46/55 14375 1821.5 0.062 
56/65 6488 1105.6 0.053 
Partner    
Married 48961 1835.8 0.070 
Single 18552 1272.1 0.058 
Education    
Higher 2627 3413.4 0.084 
First 9946 3143.4 0.090 
Hnd, hnc, teach 21606 1700.8 0.066 
A level 8795 1596.6 0.070 
O level 13289 1146.0 0.061 
Cse 3227 832.0 0.047 
None 6825 630.2 0.041 
PRP    
No 58132 1408.4 0.057 
Yes 9237 2414.2 0.091 
Contract    
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Temporary 3196 882.4 0.056 
Permanent 64324 1697.4 0.067 
Sector    
Private 44109 1789.1 0.070 
Public 19699 926.3 0.044 
Other 3721 825.1 0.042 
Union    
No 31473 1904.2 0.071 
Yes 33940 1416.1 0.061 
Hours status    
Part-time 13638 643.9 0.054 
Full-time 53650 1833.2 0.068 
Firm Size    
1-25 23,159 1489.5 0.069 
25-99 17,979 1593.9 0.063 
100-499 14,812 1681.6 0.063 
500+ 11,464 2117.4 0.072 
Occupation    
Managers and Administrators 8764 3301.0 0.098 
Professional Occupations 6359 2555.4 0.074 
Associate professional & Technical 7531 1983.7 0.069 
Clerical & Secretarial 10463 903.4 0.062 
Craft & Related 5628 1012.3 0.051 
Personal and Protective Service 7162 564.4 0.036 
Sales 4330 1514.5 0.076 
Plant & machine Operatives 5031 786.4 0.041 
Other 4517 664.2 0.036 
Total 67,414 1684.1 0.067 
 
 
Table 2 Mean (s.d.) job satisfaction scores by type of incentive status 
and intensity, BHPS, Employees, 1998-2007 
 N Overall s.d 
    
PRP    
No 58101 5.38 1.27 
Yes 9233 5.29 1.25 
Bonus    
No 49996 5.37 1.28 
Yes 17368 5.34 1.23 
Bonus Intensity    
0% 50163 5.37 1.28 
< 1% 4390 5.33 1.27 
1-3% 4407 5.32 1.25 
3-8% 4215 5.34 1.21 
8-25% 3461 5.36 1.19 
> 25% 863 5.47 1.20 
Change in bonus status    
No Bonus  No Bonus 50,607 5.38 1.27 
No Bonus  Bonus 4,266 5.33 1.26 
Bonus  No Bonus 4,003 5.24 1.32 
Bonus  Bonus 8,659 5.35 1.19 
Total 67535 5.37 1.27 
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Table 3 
Effect of Bonus Intensity on Job Satisfaction, BHPS, Employees, 1998-2007 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Ordered 
Probit 
(Whole 
sample) 
ME Prob. 
(JS = 7) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(Sample 
excluding 
PRP) 
Heckman 
(Bonus 
sample) 
Ordered 
Probit 
(Bonus+PRP 
sample) 
Bonus Intensity 
     
Proportion (continuous variable)
‡
 0.530*** 0.087 0.312** 0.419*** 0.382*** 
 (0.105) 
 
(0.139) (0.136) (0.114) 
      Proportion (dummy variables) 
     
< 1% 0.022 0.004 0.020 
 
-0.059 
 (0.023) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.037) 
1-3% 0.038* 0.006 0.006 
 
-0.046 
 (0.022) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.035) 
3-8% 0.061*** 0.010 0.031 
 
-0.024 
 (0.023) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.035) 
8-25% 0.074*** 0.013 0.061* 
 
-0.017 
 (0.029) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.039) 
> 25% 0.225*** 0.043 0.149** 
 
0.141** 
 (0.048) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.056) 
PRP -0.044** -0.007 
  
-0.099*** 
 (0.018) 
   
(0.025) 
Mills ratio 
   
-0.328 -0.023 
 
   
(0.242) (0.205) 
N 49317 
 
43162 9927 16956 
Wald Test χ2 (F in column 3) 2463.02*** 
 
22.81*** 1013.88*** 1058.23*** 
Number of  individuals 
  
10827 
  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (robust and clustered by same individual in Columns 1 and 4); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Reference category: Workers with 0% bonus pay; ‡ Estimates when continuous Proportion variable entered separately 
in regression instead of dummies; The full output of the remaining control variables can be found in Appendix Table A3. 
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Table 4 
Fixed Effects Estimates of Bonus Intensity on Facets of Job Satisfaction, 
BHPS, Employees, 1998-2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Pay Job Security Work itself Hours 
     Bonus 
Intensity     
< 1% 0.047 0.072** -0.030 0.011 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
1-3% 0.045 0.049* -0.045* 0.020 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) 
3-8% 0.104*** 0.095*** -0.032 0.044 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) 
8-25% 0.189*** 0.109*** -0.026 0.058 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.038) (0.040) 
> 25% 0.245*** 0.100 0.085 0.103 
 (0.078) (0.075) (0.070) (0.073) 
Constant 4.603*** 3.743*** 5.778*** 6.955*** 
 (0.287) (0.278) (0.258) (0.271) 
     N 43138 43019 43141 43176 
Number of 
individuals 
10824 10800 10825 10830 
R
2
 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Reference category: 
Workers with 0% bonus pay; Full regression output available from the author upon request. 
 
 Table 5 
Fixed Effects Estimates of Bonus Intensity on Job Satisfaction by Subgroups, BHPS, Employees, 1998-2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Female Male No union Union Private Public 
Skilled non-
manual  
Skilled 
manual 
Unskilled 
non-manual 
Unskilled 
manual 
 
          
Bonus 
Intensity           
< 1% 0.020 0.015 0.009 0.016 0.010 0.150** 0.041 -0.012 0.020 0.025 
 (0.040) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.029) (0.074) (0.042) (0.079) (0.042) (0.055) 
1-3% 0.038 -0.027 0.041 -0.031 0.042 -0.122 0.020 0.039 0.018 -0.092 
 (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.030) (0.084) (0.038) (0.072) (0.041) (0.066) 
3-8% 0.004 0.045 0.063 0.018 0.051 0.028 0.069* 0.189** -0.089** 0.019 
 (0.044) (0.040) (0.040) (0.047) (0.033) (0.099) (0.039) (0.076) (0.045) (0.073) 
8-25% -0.009 0.095** 0.098** 0.018 0.072* -0.083 0.077* 0.218** -0.032 -0.056 
 (0.059) (0.048) (0.048) (0.065) (0.041) (0.131) (0.043) (0.091) (0.055) (0.107) 
> 25% 0.116 0.158* 0.152* 0.047 0.166** -0.140 0.204*** 0.152 0.125 0.104 
 (0.118) (0.085) (0.081) (0.135) (0.072) (0.355) (0.073) (0.157) (0.100) (0.297) 
Constant 6.065*** 6.294*** 6.268*** 6.242*** 6.326*** 6.922*** 6.803*** 6.496*** 6.573*** 6.579*** 
 (0.357) (0.407) (0.371) (0.431) (0.329) (0.543) (0.448) (1.505) (0.441) (0.695) 
           N 22968 20194 20556 22606 27265 13539 17807 6642 18086 7827 
No of 
individuals 
5717 5110 6866 6328 8021 3418 5283 2290 5752 2948 
R
2
 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 
           Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Public sector: Civil Service, Local Government, NHS and Higher Education.  Occupational groups: 1. Skilled non-manual  = 
Managers and Administrators, Professionals and Craft and Related; 2. Skilled manual = Associate Professionals and Technical; 3. Unskilled non-manual  = Clerical and Secretarial, Personal and 
Protective Service and Sales; 4. Unskilled manual  = Plant and Machine Operatives and Other. Full regression output available from the author upon request. 
Table 6 
Fixed Effects Estimates of Change in Bonus Status Over Time on Job 
Satisfaction, BHPS, Employees, 1998-2007 
 (1) (2) 
 Change Dynamics 
   
No Bonus  Bonus (1st year) 0.005 0.026 
 (0.022) (0.020) 
Bonus  No Bonus -0.071***  
 (0.022)  
Bonus  Bonus -0.046**  
 (0.020)  
Lag - Bonus for 2 years consecutively  -0.017 
  (0.024) 
Lag - Bonus for 3 years consecutively  -0.011 
  (0.029) 
Lag - Bonus for 4 years consecutively  -0.071** 
  (0.036) 
Lag - Bonus for 5 years consecutively  -0.045 
  (0.042) 
Lag - Bonus > 5 years consecutively  -0.047 
  (0.050) 
Constant 6.004*** 5.814*** 
 (0.732) (0.233) 
N 49317 50362 
Number of individuals 11237 11406 
R
2
 0.04 0.04 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Reference category: 
Workers without change in status of no bonus pay in consecutive years; Full regression 
output available from the author upon request. 
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Appendix Table A1 
Summary statistics of main variables, BHPS, Employees, 1998-2007 
 Mean sd 
   
PRP 0.137 0.344 
Bonus 0.258 0.437 
Bonus Intensity   
0% 0.743 0.437 
< 1% 0.065 0.247 
1-3% 0.065 0.247 
3-8% 0.062 0.242 
8-25% 0.051 0.221 
> 25% 0.013 0.112 
Gender 0.477 0.499 
Age 38.947 11.650 
Partner 0.725 0.446 
Ln (pay) 1.767 0.535 
Ln (hours) 3.477 0.400 
Permanent 0.953 0.212 
Time travel 23.519 20.684 
Annual increments 0.481 0.500 
Promotion opportunities 0.505 0.500 
Union 0.519 0.500 
Two Jobs 0.083 0.276 
Full-time 0.797 0.402 
Pension scheme 0.731 0.443 
Employer premises 0.816 0.387 
Household income 36461.82 22725.11 
   Education   
Higher 0.040 0.195 
First 0.150 0.357 
Hnd, hnc, teach 0.326 0.469 
A level 0.133 0.339 
O level  0.200 0.400 
Cse 0.049 0.215 
None 0.103 0.304 
Health   
Excellent 0.275 0.446 
Good 0.489 0.500 
Fair 0.185 0.388 
Poor 0.045 0.208 
Very Poor 0.006 0.080 
Supervisory duties   
Manager 0.220 0.414 
Foreman/supervisor 0.150 0.357 
None 0.630 0.483 
Sector   
Private 0.653 0.476 
Civil Service 0.046 0.210 
Local Government 0.157 0.364 
NHS/Higher Edu 0.089 0.284 
Other 0.019 0.138 
Non-profit orgs. 0.036 0.186 
Firm size   
1-25m 0.344 0.475 
25-99 0.267 0.442 
100-499 0.220 0.414 
500+ 0.170 0.376 
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Appendix Table A2 
Sensitivity Analysis of Effect of Bonus Intensity on Job Satisfaction, BHPS, Employees, 1998-
2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ordered Probit 
(Sample 
excluding PRP) 
Ordered Probit  
(2-digit 
occupation) 
Ordered Probit 
(Gross bonus 
response only) 
Ordered Probit 
(Relative bonus) 
Ordered Probit 
(Regional 
Unemployment) 
      Bonus Intensity  
 
   
< 1% 0.036 0.041* 0.017 0.037 0.026 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) 
1-3% 0.055** 0.056** 0.055** 0.056** 0.044* 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) 
3-8% 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) 
8-25% 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.115*** 0.104*** 0.089** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.036) 
> 25% 0.231*** 0.214*** 0.281*** 0.248*** 0.0242*** 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.069) (0.061) (0.059) 
Relative bonus    -0.218  
    (0.252)  
Regional Unem     -0.007 
     (0.009) 
N 42288 42288 39588 42288 38196 
χ2 Wald Test  2250*** 2430*** 2167*** 2251*** 2079*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Reference category: Workers with 0% bonus 
pay; The comparison bonus term has been defined as the average bonus by gender, age group, occupation, region and year; 
The Regional unemployment term is defined as the claimant count rates of the UK regions for the years 1998-2006, as 
indicated by the Office for National Statistics (ONS); Full regression output available from the author upon request. 
 
 
Appendix Table A3 
Effect of Control Variables on Job Satisfaction, BHPS, Employees, 1998-2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Ordered Probit 
(Whole Sample) 
Fixed Effects 
(Sample excluding 
PRP) 
Heckman Outcome 
Equation 
(Bonus Sample) 
Selection Equation 
Pr (B = 1) (Sample 
excluding PRP) 
Demographic 
    
Male -0.137*** 
 
-0.158*** 0.061*** 
 (0.018) 
 
(0.031) (0.017) 
Age -0.023*** -0.002 -0.015* 0.015*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) 
Age square 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Partner 0.087*** 0.000 0.066** 0.026 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.030) (0.017) 
Education  
(Omitted: No qualif)     
Higher degree -0.300*** 
 
-0.157* -0.038 
 (0.046) 
 
(0.087) (0.048) 
First degree -0.265*** 
 
-0.237*** 0.015 
 (0.034) 
 
(0.055) (0.031) 
Hnd, hnc, teaching -0.199*** 
 
-0.029 -0.020 
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 (0.036) 
 
(0.058) (0.033) 
A-level -0.184*** 
 
-0.189*** 0.134*** 
 (0.030) 
 
(0.050) (0.025) 
O-level -0.100*** 
 
-0.033 0.128*** 
 (0.028) 
 
(0.047) (0.023) 
Cse -0.055 
 
0.063 0.096*** 
 (0.041) 
 
(0.060) (0.033) 
Health status 
(Omitted: very poor)      
Excellent 0.370*** 0.424*** 0.816*** 0.174* 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.179) (0.094) 
Good 0.160** 0.308*** 0.606*** 0.175* 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.178) (0.094) 
Fair 0.001 0.190** 0.458** 0.173* 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.179) (0.094) 
Poor -0.071 0.087 0.319* 0.146 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.185) (0.099) 
Household income 0.001** -0.000 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Financial situation: 
Change last year 
(Omitted: better off) 
    
Worse off -0.340*** -0.260*** -0.356*** -0.102*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.039) (0.020) 
About same -0.154*** -0.144*** -0.112*** -0.055*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.029) (0.016) 
Financial 
expectations next 
year  
(Omitted: better) 
    
Worse -0.209*** -0.161*** -0.242*** 0.046 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.049) (0.028) 
Same 0.007 -0.008 0.010 0.029* 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.027) (0.016) 
Job-related 
    
Ln (hours) -0.203*** -0.206*** -0.291*** 0.074** 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.072) (0.037) 
Permanent contract 0.131*** 0.053 0.185 0.510*** 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.150) (0.051) 
Travel to work time -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Annual increments  
in pay 
0.127*** 0.132*** 0.123*** 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.025) (0.015) 
Promotion 
opportunities  
0.208*** 0.276*** 0.232*** 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.027) (0.015) 
Trade union at 
workplace 
-0.112*** 0.009 -0.088** -0.119*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.036) (0.017) 
Second job  -0.029 -0.061** 0.002 -0.013 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.049) (0.027) 
Full-time (> 30 
hours per week) 
-0.090*** -0.071** -0.118* 0.037 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.062) (0.034) 
Employer runs 
pension scheme 
-0.048** -0.012 -0.123** 0.245*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.054) (0.019) 
Work at employer‟s -0.057*** -0.064** -0.049 0.024 
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premises 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.038) (0.021) 
Supervisory duties 
(omit: none)     
Manager 0.049** 0.017 0.115** 0.118*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.047) (0.024) 
Foreman/supervisor -0.010 -0.010 0.045 0.106*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.038) (0.020) 
Sector  
(omitted: Private)     
Civil Service 0.012 0.149** 0.173 -0.504*** 
 (0.039) (0.058) (0.120) (0.038) 
Local Government 0.117*** 0.201*** 0.284 -1.053*** 
 (0.029) (0.039) (0.223) (0.033) 
NHS/Higher educ. 0.110*** 0.236*** 0.441** -0.894*** 
 (0.034) (0.046) (0.197) (0.039) 
Other 0.076 0.169*** -0.092 -0.173*** 
 (0.052) (0.059) (0.096) (0.051) 
Non-profit orgs. 0.110*** 0.235*** 0.257* -0.515*** 
 (0.037) (0.050) (0.136) (0.045) 
Firm Size  
(omitted: 1-24)     
25-99 -0.106*** -0.025 -0.126*** -0.053*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.035) (0.019) 
100-499 -0.155*** -0.095*** -0.226*** -0.009 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.035) (0.020) 
500+ -0.139*** -0.094*** -0.173*** 0.036 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.041) (0.024) 
Occupation 
(omitted: Manager)     
Professional -0.026 0.017 0.114** -0.025 
 (0.030) (0.039) (0.057) (0.033) 
Associate 
Professional/Technic
al 
0.005 0.094*** 0.040 -0.030 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.051) (0.030) 
Clerical/Secretarial -0.111*** 0.014 -0.140*** 0.092*** 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.053) (0.030) 
Craft and related -0.057* -0.023 0.015 -0.114*** 
 (0.034) (0.044) (0.062) (0.034) 
Personal/Protective 
Service 
0.082** -0.002 0.048 -0.181*** 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.075) (0.036) 
Sales -0.135*** -0.107** -0.172*** 0.053 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.060) (0.035) 
Plant/Machine 
Operatives 
-0.128*** -0.118*** -0.059 -0.055 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.061) (0.035) 
Other -0.134*** -0.109*** -0.207*** 0.091** 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.068) (0.037) 
IV: pay slip seen by 
interviewer    
0.039*** 
 
   
(0.003) 
Constant 
 
5.980*** 6.727*** -2.176*** 
 
 
(0.254) (0.671) (0.194) 
     N 49317 43162 9927 49411 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (robust cluster in Column 1); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Industry, region and time 
dummies have also been included as controls; Full regression output available from the author upon request. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Gneezy‟s (2004) W-effect refers to the effect of the provision of both positive (bonuses) and negative (fines) incentives on 
worker performance, as depicted in a 4-quadrant diagram.  However, as the focus of this paper is on the provision of positive 
incentives only, as measured by the amount of bonuses received, it is therefore more accurate to speak of the “V-effect”.   
2 As noted by Prendergast (1999, p. 7), these modes of furnishing employee effort vary widely across different organizations, with 
some firms relying on explicit contracts that tie pay to observable measures of (individual or aggregate) performance (piece rates, 
stock options, bonuses, profit sharing), others preferring reward systems that are based on more discretionary subjective measures 
of productivity, and some eschewing the use of pay-for-performance altogether in favour of alternative (dynamic) strategies 
(promotions, efficiency wages, deferred compensation, career concerns etc.). 
3 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that even after controlling for the sorting effects of variable pay, the mean wages of workers 
earning part (or all) of their income due to explicit incentives are higher than of those who are paid according to time rates (Seiler, 
1984; Brown, 1992; Booth and Frank, 1999; Parent, 1999; Lazear, 2000).   
4 This is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that human beings may receive pleasure from wage increases per se, as 
they consistently favour upward-sloping earnings profiles even if their present discounted value is lower than that of flatter 
profiles (Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991; Frank and Hutchens, 1993).   
5 The first experiment involved a group of university students who were offered different marginal payoffs for giving correct 
answers to an IQ test, while in the second  the group of interest were high-school students doing volunteer work by collecting 
donations for charitable organizations.  A related field study was also carried out by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000[b]) emphasizing 
the effect of penalties, such as fines for late arrivals of parents collecting their children in Israeli day-care centres.  In contradiction 
to the deterrence hypothesis, according to which one would expect to observe a reduction in a sanctioned behaviour, the effect that 
was observed was an increase in the number of late-coming parents after the imposition of the fine.  Interestingly, once the fine 
was removed no reduction occurred in the number of late arrivals, thus suggesting that changing perceptions, once realized, are 
hard to reverse.  The deterrence hypothesis has also been recently rejected by the neutrally framed laboratory experiment of 
Horisch and Strassmair (2008), who test whether crime is weakly decreasing in the probability and severity of punishment.  
Allowing for subjects to steal from another participant‟s payoff, they show that except for very high levels of incentives, subjects 
steal more the stronger the incentives.  They also observe that this effect depends on whether the subjects are selfish or fair-
minded, with the former complying with the predictions of agency theory and deterrent incentives backfiring for the latter.   
6 “Of course, the question of what is a high reward or fine is case-dependent” (Gneezy, 2004, p. 8).  As argued by Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000, p. 805), not all small compensations may be insulting, neither are insulting compensations necessarily small.     
7 Respondents were asked “Does your pay ever include incentive bonuses or profit related pay?” from the first year of the survey 
(1991), although the definition of the question was altered in 1996.  
8 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the bonus and the PRP questions is 0.24.  Specifically, only 7.2% of the sample 
receive both types of incentive compensation simultaneously, while 6.5% are recipients of individual PRP only and 18.6% of 
bonuses/profit-sharing pay only.  The remaining percentage (67.7%) receives no form of performance-contingent pay.    
9 The questions regarding the facets of promotion prospects, relations with boss, and the use of initiative were discontinued after 
the 7th wave.   
10 The influence of the remaining covariates, apart from those of incentive intensity, is in accordance with the predictions of 
previous research (Frey and Stutzer, 2002).      
11 In order to facilitate estimation of equation (6), a linear probability model is assumed, since dealing with fixed effects when the 
dependent variable (JS) is ordinal can be problematic.  Moreover, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fritjers (2004) conclude that although 
the inclusion of panel individual effects is important for the estimation of subjective well-being models, adopting the assumption 
of cardinality for the satisfaction responses does not make much of a difference.  As a robustness check, equation (6) has also been 
estimated using an appropriate linearization of the ordinal JS variable based on the so-called Probit OLS (POLS) approach (van 
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004), which replaces JS using a „conditional mean‟ approximation that takes into consideration the 
frequency distribution of the variable.  No significant differences in the results are found (available upon request from the author).  
12 A quadratic Proportion term has also been entered into the specification in order to examine whether there are any non-linearities 
in the effect of incentive intensity on job satisfaction, but this variable was found to have an insignificant influence. 
